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KEYNOTE ADDRESS
ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CONTEXT:
A TYPOLOGY AND A WARNING
NOAH FELDMAN*
In the spring of 2010, I, alongside a number of other academics who
focus on topics connected to Islamic law, participated in a symposium at the
University of St. Thomas School of Law on the topic of “Islamic Law and
Constitutional Liberty.”1 At the time, there seemed to be nothing especially
unusual about either the topic or the content. The organizers asked partici-
pants to address two questions: “First, what challenges and opportunities
face democracies in Muslim-majority nations as they seek to integrate Is-
lamic law with the rights typically accorded in constitutional democracies?
Second, what tensions exist between adherence to Islamic law and the
norms of liberal democracies in nations with growing Muslim minorities?”2
As my own work has addressed the first of these questions extensively,
both as a matter of theory and in practice in Iraq,3 I prepared remarks pro-
posing a general theoretical structure for making sense of the complex rela-
tionship between Islamic law and constitutional structure. I left the second
question to others, and in my public remarks, I remained silent on both the
specific language in the title of the symposium and the formulation adopted
by the conference organizers in stating the second question.
Then, over the summer of 2010, something truly terrible happened.
Beginning with a dispute over the potential placement of an Islamic com-
munity center at Park51, a site included in the extensive redevelopment of
the areas near the site of the former World Trade Center buildings, the
United States entered into an episode of publicly expressed anti-Muslim
* Noah Feldman is Bemis Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. His most recent book
is Scorpions: The Battles and Triumphs of FDR’s Great Supreme Court Justices.
1. For a brief overview, see Robert A. Kahn, Islam Symposium: Introduction, 7 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. vii (2010).
2. University of St. Thomas News Service, Legal scholars to discuss ‘Islamic Law and
Constitutional Liberty’ at Law Journal Symposium Monday, BULLETIN TODAY, (Tuesday, Apr. 6,
2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.stthomas.edu/bulletin/2010/04/06/legal-scholars-to-discuss-islamic-
law-and-constitutional-liberty-at-law-journal-symposium-monday/.
3. NOAH FELDMAN, WHAT WE OWE IRAQ (2004).
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sentiment unprecedented in our history—even, remarkably enough, in the
wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks.
The episode had multiple parts. Its initial stage involved the claim that
a mosque was being proposed for the Ground Zero site—a misstatement
both of the purpose of the proposed community center and the location of
its site.4 It continued with an increasingly partisan division over the propri-
ety of building the community center. Opponents then began criticizing
mosque-building elsewhere in the United States, including in Murfreesboro,
Tennessee.5 Parallels to a recently enacted Swiss law prohibiting the build-
ing of minarets were difficult to avoid.6 President Barack Obama drew at-
tention to the constitutional questions raised by the episode by offering the
view that any religious group must have the right to build wherever it
wished.7 But that did not end the episode. Anti-Muslim sentiment continued
to be expressed.
Frequently, this anti-Muslim sentiment was coupled with public claims
about the threats to the United States posed by Islamic law. The pinnacle of
this absurdist scenario—absurdist if it were not so dangerous—was a pro-
posed state constitutional amendment in Oklahoma that purported to ban
the state’s courts from using or citing Islamic law in their decisions.8 The
amendment passed in a referendum and was duly enacted, despite its likely
unconstitutionality under the Equal Protection and Free Exercise Clauses of
the Constitution.9 Anti-Muslim bias had now taken legal form.
After the midterm elections of November 2010, the public tenor of this
episode appeared, thankfully, to have receded—perhaps an indication of the
partisan nature that much of it seemed to display. But in the wake of these
events—a kind of two-months’-hate that had not been directed toward a
religious minority in the United States since the anti-Jehovah’s Witnesses
4. Clyde Haberman, In Islamic Center Fight, Lessons in Prepositions and Fear-Mongering,
N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2010, at A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/27/nyregion/27
nyc.html (noting that it is misleading to call the Park51 center a “mosque,” and that the proposed
site is not “at” Ground Zero, as some opponents claim, but only “near” Ground Zero).
5. See, e.g., Bradley Blackburn, Plan for Mosque in Tennessee Town Draws Criticism from
Residents, ABC NEWS, June 18, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/WN/murfreesboro-tennessee-
mosque-plan-draws-criticism-residents/story?id=10956381; Elisabeth Kauffman, In Murfrees-
boro, Tenn.: Church ‘Yes,’ Mosque ‘No’, TIME, Aug. 19, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/nation/
article/0,8599,2011847,00.html.
6. See Edward Cody, Switzerland Votes to Prohibit the Building of Mosque Minarets,
WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2009, at A10, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/con-
tent/article/2009/11/29/AR2009112900482.html.
7. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Says Mosque Remarks Were About Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 15, 2010, at A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/15/us/politics/15mosque.
html (quoting President Obama as stating: “I believe that Muslims have the same right to practice
their religion as everyone else in this country. And that includes the right to build a place of
worship and a community center on private property in Lower Manhattan, in accordance with
local laws and ordinances.”).
8. See James C. McKinley, Jr., Oklahoma Surprise: Islam as an Election Issue, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 2010, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/15/us/15oklahoma.html.
9. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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violence of 194010 and the extended anti-Mormon bias of the nineteenth
century11—my own decision not to address the symposium’s title or its sec-
ond question needs to be revisited. In an environment of public disparage-
ment of Muslims and Islam—disparagement specifically connected to
Islamic law and constitutionalism—I feel it would be irresponsible to
reproduce here in writing my theoretical treatment of the question of Is-
lamic law and constitutionalism in majority-Muslim countries without pref-
acing a discussion of the frame and formulation of the conference in which
they were first delivered.
Let me begin, then, with the title of the symposium, “Islamic Law and
Constitutional Liberty.” In principle there is nothing wrong with such a for-
mulation except that it is somewhat limited. Why focus on constitutional
liberty but not other constitutional values such as equality or the separation
of religion and government? In my remarks, I finessed this question by
simply acting as though the symposium was asking me to address all as-
pects of constitutional values and their relation to Islamic law in majority-
Muslim states. In retrospect, however, it is necessary to ask whether the
focus on liberty in particular in the symposium’s title reflected some as-
sumption, unconscious or otherwise, that Islamic law posed a special threat
to the general phenomenon of constitutional liberty, taken to mean some-
thing like “the benefits of living in a liberal, constitutional state.”
Considered in the context of majority-Muslim countries where, as I
shall discuss below, political movements associated with Islam have sought
to infuse the constitution with Islamic values, this assumption might per-
haps be defended as a starting point for discussion. Considered, however, in
the context of the United States and the West generally, where Muslims are
minority communities, such a hidden assumption would be troubling in-
deed. The implication would be that somehow, private adherence to Islamic
religious law by Muslims threatens the constitutional liberties of others.
It should be needless to say—though obviously it is not—that the pri-
vate religious actions and beliefs of Muslims or any religious community
cannot threaten the constitutional liberties of others (or themselves for that
matter) in the American structure of constitutional law and theory. Constitu-
tional rights are public rights that protect individuals from state action. Pri-
vate actions cannot threaten such public rights, or even implicate them.
The reason this point needs to be made is that supporters of the
Oklahoma amendment apparently believe precisely that adherence to Is-
lamic law by Muslims threatens general constitutional liberty. Otherwise it
would be hard to make sense of the somewhat bizarre command of the
amendment to courts not to cite or rely upon Islamic law. After all, Islamic
10. See NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA’S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM—AND
WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT 156 (2005).
11. See, e.g., id. at 99–110 (2005) (discussing the genesis of the federal prohibition of plural
marriage).
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law is not a source of law in Oklahoma, nor has anyone taken any steps to
make it so. For Islamic or any other religious law to serve as a source of law
in the United States would almost certainly violate the Establishment
Clause—notwithstanding the pre-revolutionary, pre-constitutional tradition
of declaring that Christianity is part of the common law, an archaism that
some courts invoked into the nineteenth century.12 The supporters of the
Oklahoma amendment are wrong. There is no threat to constitutional liberty
in play when private citizens follow the dictates of religious conscience.
It may seem unnecessarily textually sensitive to express concern about
the title of the symposium; but the effort is nevertheless worthwhile, I be-
lieve, because of the formulation of the second question for the symposium,
the one I did not address in my remarks. This question asked, “What ten-
sions exist between adherence to Islamic law and the norms of liberal de-
mocracies in nations with growing Muslim minorities?”13 Here the possible
association between private practice of Islamic law and general liberty is
raised a bit more explicitly. After all, we must ask, what tension could exist
prima facie between “adherence to Islamic law” and liberal constitutional
norms?
If by “adherence” we are referring to private actions by private parties,
the answer is once again, “none.” Constitutional liberalism is built on the
fundamental premise that private religious conduct is to be respected, and
that it does not threaten the public constitutional rights of others. It is as
though one asked, “What tensions exist between receiving Holy Commu-
nion and the norms of liberal democracies in countries with growing Catho-
lic minorities?” Such questions were, as a matter of fact, asked in the
nineteenth century United States—and they were illiberal, anti-Catholic,
and nativist.14 They depended on the assumption—sometimes hidden,
sometimes not—that Catholicism and democratic citizenship were incom-
patible. It took generations for the American public to rid itself of this
prejudiced view, and it would be especially shameful if a symposium at a
Catholic law school were to be interpreted as raising a similar charge re-
garding Muslims.
One hopes, then—and indeed, one must insist—that the tensions about
which the symposium’s second question asks are only possible tensions re-
garding some imagined state adherence to Islamic law, which would, natu-
rally enough, raise constitutional questions. Yet even this hope is not
without its worrisome aspects. After all, the paranoia (that is not too strong
12. See, e.g., Vidal v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 43 U.S. 127, 198 (1844) (“Christianity [is] a
part of the common law of the state [of Pennsylvania] . . . .”); see also Rector of Holy Trinity
Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892) (quoting Vidal’s statement on the common law
and adding that “this is a Christian nation”).
13. University of St. Thomas News Service, supra note 2.
14. David Brion Davis, Some Ideological Functions of Prejudice in Ante-Bellum America, 15
AM. Q. 115, 120–25 (1963).
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a word) which exists regarding Islamic law in the United States—again,
reflected in the Oklahoma amendment—seems strangely fixated on the
imagined possibility that Muslims in the United States are somehow plan-
ning to implement Islamic law as a binding legal system in this country.
This is, needless to say, a view for which no evidence exists, or at least
none I have ever seen. As the satirist and social commentator Stephen Col-
bert has noted in regard to the Oklahoma law, “Just because something
doesn’t exist doesn’t mean you shouldn’t ban it.”15
As other participants in the symposium ably noted, there is no plan or
aspiration on the part of American Muslims for Islamic law to be treated
any differently than Jewish law or canon law in the occasional interactions
between religious and secular legal systems that arise in a liberal democ-
racy. There are, of course, general constitutional questions that arise in this
specialized, not to say obscure, area. Can the state certify food as kosher?16
This question could be asked in parallel about food that is halal. Can the
state require or enforce a prenuptial contractual agreement in which one
party promises to grant a Jewish religious divorce in case of civil divorce?17
This question, addressed by American courts, could be asked in parallel
regarding Islamic marriage contracts.
In asking these questions, however, we would ordinarily be careful not
to imply that American Jews who sought such laws were hoping to estab-
lish Jewish law as a constitutional norm. To the contrary, it would be obvi-
ous, as it should be in the case of American Muslims, that what is sought is
simply ordinary religious accommodation for private religious practice.
The point, then, is that after the anti-Muslim sentiments of the summer
and fall of 2010, one cannot be too careful in insisting that, in the United
States, there is literally no reason to think there is “tension” between Is-
lamic law and constitutional liberty. In the comments that follow, which
track my public remarks at the symposium, I endeavor to address a wholly
distinct issue: the relation between constitutional structure and Islamic law
in those majority-Muslim countries where political movements have ex-
pressly sought to bring Islamic law into the formal constitutional order. It is
to this issue that I now turn.
The overarching question of the relationship between Sharia and con-
stitutional liberty can be addressed on three different levels. These three
planes or spheres of analysis are features of every constitutional system in
the world. They are the political sphere, or the political plane; the philo-
15. The Colbert Report: Stephen Colbert Gives You Props (Comedy Central television
broadcast Nov. 3, 2010), available at http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/364
378/november-03-2010/stephen-colbert-gives-you-props.
16. See, e.g., Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415 (2d Cir.
2002); Ran-Dav’s County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608 A.2d 1353 (N.J. 1992).
17. See Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1983).
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sophical sphere; and the sphere of what I shall call institutions and law, or
the institutional-legal plane.
Begin with the political: all constitutional systems, wherever they are,
deal with and engage political structures within a society. Most importantly,
they deal with the competition between different political structures in a
society. In some places, those political forces will be arranged into political
parties, but it is not always the case that political parties are the form of
organization. Sometimes there are mass social movements that exist outside
of party politics.18 Sometimes there are small groups of individuals with
strong feelings on certain issues. In some societies, the political forces are
arranged around clans or around families or around religious denominations
or around the very broad set of possibilities for human association.
All of those different forms of human association can be characterized
as political. What characterizes them in a constitutional system is that they
struggle with one another for power. That does not mean it is an absolute
struggle. It is not always a struggle to the death.19 Very frequently, it is a
struggle among negotiating parties for how power will be allocated amongst
them. But the core of any constitutional system that is functioning as a
constitutional system is that it provides a mechanism—or really a set of
mechanisms—for reconciling, managing, and negotiating the competing de-
mands of different political forces within a society.
Today, in many, though by no means all, majority-Muslim countries,
one of the most powerful, energetic, and popular social and political forces,
when measured both by opinion polls and also by elections, is the move-
ment that we usually call the Islamist movement.20 “Islamism” refers not
simply to Islam as a faith or to Muslims as people who belong to that faith
and choose to associate themselves with it. By Islamism, I mean to desig-
nate a self-consciously political movement that draws upon the very con-
tested, rich, and influential ideas and beliefs associated with the religious
tradition of Islam to make political claims and to organize people into polit-
ical action.
It is important to offer this clarification, because although many Mus-
lims today do describe themselves as Islamists, many others simply would
say there is no difference between their religion and their political move-
ment.21 Islamism, in my view, can broadly be characterized as the political
movement that incorporates people who believe in something like the sim-
18. See Ju¨rgen Habermas, New Social Movements, 49 TELOS 33 (1981).
19. I am distinguishing my view from that of Carl Schmitt. See CARL SCHMITT, THE CON-
CEPT OF THE POLITICAL (George Schwab trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1996) (1932).
20. See NOAH FELDMAN, AFTER JIHAD: AMERICA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ISLAMIC DEMOC-
RACY 7, 46–50 (2003).
21. That is characteristic of people in all sorts of movements, all over the world, who do not
necessarily want to acknowledge that there is any difference between their core religious identity
and their core political identity. That is an individual choice for a person to make.
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ple slogan, “Islam is the Answer.” That is an actual political slogan, which
has existed in various parts of the Muslim world, and especially in the
Arabic-speaking world, for almost three generations now.22 It is framed as a
political organizing slogan, but it also has the full range of associations—
religious, social, even economic—that characterize successful political
movements.
The Islamist movement—which itself is a very deeply complex and
varied movement, including Sunnis of many different ideological stripes,
and some, but by no means all, Shiite Muslims—has generated within itself
a range of identifiable, constitutional, and political goals. The political par-
ties that consider themselves Islamists in the Arabic-speaking Sunni world,
are mostly associated with the international movement known as the Mus-
lim Brotherhood. The political parties affiliated with the Muslim Brother-
hood (and there are different political parties in different countries)
typically offer a detailed, organized, and extremely sophisticated political-
constitutional vision of how they would like to shape, change, or interpret
the constitutional practices of the countries in which they are based. To
make this abstract point very concrete, if one visits the website of the Mus-
lim Brotherhood in Egypt, there will be a constitutional plan. One can click
on the constitutional plan and see a description of how the members of that
political party, those who write, debate, and argue about the plans, would
like to see constitutional affairs organized in Egypt.23
In Arabic-speaking countries during the last two decades, going back
to the Algerian elections of 1990 and 1991, there have been relatively free
elections with political parties identifying themselves as Islamists and pro-
moting a worldview connected to a set of constitutional claims. These par-
ties have out-performed expectations, and in many cases, they have done
extraordinarily well.
This is not a coincidence. It is partly a result of the rise of their politi-
cal movement during those years. One sign of a political movement being
on the rise is that it can garner votes. That means that in the constitutional
discourse of the Arabic-speaking world, and by extension and as a result of
the powerful influence of the Arabic-speaking world in much of the broader
Muslim world, the topic of constitutionalism and Islam has been a pressing
political topic for much of the last two decades.
What began as a set of ideas discussed among political activists or
political elites expanded to become much broader in the wake of the new
constitutions produced in Afghanistan and Iraq, in the wake of U.S. occupa-
tion. In each case, the constitutional process formally took place when the
country was not under formal U.S. occupation. But, de facto, both of those
22. The slogan is associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note
20, at 42–44; Kristen Stilt, “Islam is the Solution”: Constitutional Visions of the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 73 (2010).
23. See NOAH FELDMAN, THE FALL AND RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE 117–26 (2008).
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countries were under U.S. occupation when the constitutional processes
began.
In both Afghanistan and Iraq, political movements that in some general
sense can be characterized as Islamist pressed political claims for how con-
stitutional law should be arranged. In this category of the political, I want to
identify Islamism as a very powerful and engaged political movement that
makes constitutional claims. It is not the case that Islamism was the only
political force at work in the constitutional or political debates of the time.
There were other political forces as well, ranging from secular voices who
made an argument for secular politics and secular constitutionalism, to eth-
nic or denominational groups that made ethnic or denominational claims. In
the case of Iraq, for example, the Kurdish national movement made a series
of very powerful and engaged political-constitutional arguments for federal-
ism based primarily on ethnicity, language, and culture. There is also a
broader rights-based constitutionalism that, despite not yet finding a large
political constituency, nevertheless exists in discursive space. At the crucial
moments of public negotiation over constitutional affairs, however, Islam
has remained a major factor in the political debate.
Philosophy, the second category of analysis, is useful for thinking
about constitutional systems. It seems very abstract, and lawyers generally
do not like it. In the context of constitutions, philosophy is tremendously
important because constitutional systems typically claim to have grand phil-
osophical principles that underlie the very existence of the political order.
That is not invariably the case. If one considers Great Britain’s unwritten
constitution (which has many written components, but for many generations
was thought to be an unwritten constitution), it was a little hard to pin down
what the deep philosophical principles were, precisely because they were
contested. The principles were debated, but not written down. Written con-
stitutions in particular typically present themselves as making certain grand
philosophical claims. The popular and the elite debates, and the legal debate
about what those philosophical claims are, take on outside significance for
the foundations of constitutional law.
Consider an example taken from the U.S. context. The Declaration of
Independence contains a very famous formulation, drafted, I note, by two
people who were deists at most—Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin:
“[T]hat all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable Rights.”24 That formulation, needless to say, has
religious content. Not only does it mention a creator, it specifies that the
source of some basic rights is the fact of endowment at the moment of
creation. The U.S. Constitution, by contrast, makes no reference to a crea-
tor. In fact, in the nineteenth century, there was a very active political
movement in the United States of people who wanted to amend the U.S.
24. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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Constitution so that it would mention God.25 They believed that the U.S.
Constitution was deeply flawed by its failure to mention God, and they
wanted it changed.
The silence of the Constitution on this question led to a rich, lively,
and ongoing debate in the world of American constitutional thought about
the philosophical foundations of our constitutional liberties. Are the founda-
tions grounded in a divine source, the creator of the Declaration? Or are
they instead grounded in positive law, in the fact that the Constitution cre-
ates these rights and specifies them?
Or is it ultimately some complicated combination of those two things?
That is what an outsider looking at our system would say: “Well, some
people in the United States believe one thing. Others believe another
thing—and they have been arguing about it pretty successfully for most of
the last couple of centuries,” (successful in that they are still arguing about
it). The one time that people of the United States went to war with each
other, we did not go to war over this question. We went to war over other
questions that were also unresolved in our Constitution, namely, the ques-
tions of race and slavery. So the philosophical plane has tremendous weight
when people are asking the philosophical question of what we are doing
here as a people, and what principles our Constitution stands for. Of course,
one can live one’s entire life as a lawyer, doing the practical business of
law, without ever thinking too deeply about the philosophical foundations
of a system. It is only if one either has a taste for philosophy or, perhaps
more importantly, if one is interested in answering the question of who we
are as a country, that one will suddenly find that these philosophical issues
are tremendously pressing.
Now, in the Muslim world too, wherever constitutional debates occur,
philosophical debates about the nature of the state take place as well. Those
philosophical debates are very much like philosophical debates that happen
in the United States. They involve people making claims about the true
nature of their constitutional system by pointing to language in their consti-
tutions; to religious and cultural and theological values of their societies; to
the way their societies are organized; and, to the practical ways that things
are run there. It is fair to say that in many Muslim-majority countries, these
debates are just as equivocal as they are in the United States. In the process
of shaping those debates, people are very interested in introducing language
into their constitution that will support their view of the true nature of their
system with respect to its philosophical foundations.
In countries with active Islamist movements that reflect, or are in-
tended to reflect, claims about the philosophical nature of Islam, three fea-
tures of constitutional systems are commonly found. The first feature is
general statements specifying that Islam or Sharia is to be a source of law,
25. FELDMAN, supra note 10, at 131–32.
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or the source of law. That sounds like a very powerful message about the
philosophical nature of the state, and it is meant to be. Provisions like that
have been desiderata of Islamist political movements wherever they have
been involved in constitutional debate and negotiations, including in both
Iraq and Afghanistan.
A second set of provisions relates to the question of whether any law
passed by a legislature in the constitutional system in question may be al-
lowed to exist if it violates either the values of Islamic law or the specific
provisions of Islamic law. These provisions are sometimes called repug-
nancy clauses.26 It may seem an unpleasant sounding name, but it is just a
technical categorization. Repugnancy clauses mandate that any law that vi-
olates some set of principles of Islam will be interpreted as or treated as
repugnant to the constitutional system, and therefore void. A better way to
describe these, in my view, is to call them a version of Islamic judicial
review.27 These constitutional provisions specify that some entity, either a
court or some other institution, will have the responsibility of reviewing
legislative decisions and determining whether they are consistent with ei-
ther values of the Sharia or the Sharia itself, depending on how the provi-
sion is drafted.
The third constitutional component that reflects philosophical claims
about the nature of the state and its relationship to Islam has to do with
family law. For very complicated reasons—which I will not go to at length
here—in almost all majority-Muslim countries, family law, including mar-
riage and divorce, and sometimes inheritance, are shaped in various compli-
cated ways by legal principles and rules derived from the classical Islamic
legal tradition of Sharia.28 Most constitutions in the majority-Muslim world
acknowledge this historic and continuing reliance in some way. When there
is political negotiation over a constitution, and people are making philo-
sophical claims about the nature of the Islamic state, family law always
arises. It is worth pausing to note that the fact that something is discussed in
the context of philosophy does not mean it does not also have a political
context. Nor does it mean that it does not have an institutional-legal result.
In the context of philosophical discussion, using Islamic law as part of the
mechanism for adjudicating family law relations often becomes a philo-
sophically crucial part of the picture.
The point with respect to philosophical debate is this: just as in the
United States, there is an ongoing and rich philosophical debate about the
26. FELDMAN, supra note 23, at 121–24; see also, e.g., CLARK B. LOMBARDI, STATE LAW AS
ISLAMIC LAW IN MODERN EGYPT: THE INCORPORATION OF THE SHARI’A INTO EGYPTIAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 201–56 (2006) (discussing specific cases the Supreme Constitutional Court reviewed
for compliance with the Shari’a).
27. FELDMAN, supra note 23, at 121–22.
28. See Frank Griffel, Introduction to SHARI’A: ISLAMIC LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY CON-
TEXT 1, 1–19 (Abbas Amanat & Frank Griffel eds., 2007).
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true principles that underlie the state, so, in many Muslim-majority coun-
tries, there exists an ongoing debate about the extent to which the state is
fundamentally based upon Islam or Islamic ideas or the extent to which the
state is based upon some other positive law values or popular democratic
values, or even monarchic values.
We turn now to the third plane of analysis, the institutional-legal. This
is an awkward name, but it has two important components: the institutions
that administer laws and the content of the laws themselves. Earlier sessions
at this conference generated an interesting conversation about the institu-
tional complexity of administering family law systems, mostly in Western
countries, with respect to religious pluralism and diversity within those
countries.29
The same institutional difficulty exists in any legal system when the
time comes to work out the details of administering any legal problem. This
can be so in family law, where there are individual family-by-family deter-
minations that have to be made. The law must decide what institutional
body—a court, an arbitration body, a community body—gets to make the
relevant decisions. This can be true in civil and criminal law, where we
must specify the rules that make up the body of law, and then form institu-
tions. These institutions do not just include courts, but also the criminal
justice system more broadly, like punishment systems, prisons, police, and
other forms of enforcement—all of which are part of the institutional pic-
ture of how legal systems operate in the real world. This is also true at the
level of constitutional law, because constitutional law, with its complex
doctrinal apparatus, has institutional forms through which it operates.
Again, those begin with courts, but they also include the institutional bal-
ance between—at least in the United States—the Executive Branch, Legis-
lative Branch, Judicial Branch, and let us not forget, the Administrative
Branch of government (which, though not mentioned in our constitution,
could be described as the fourth branch of government). One must also
consider institutions that are not even mentioned in that account, like the
press, which is sometimes referred to as though it were a branch of govern-
ment, or non-governmental associations. Non-governmental associations
have a crucial civil-society role to play in most democracies, and function
institutionally as part of constitutional democracy.
29. John Bowen, Can an English Court Enforce Islamic Shariah?, Keynote Address at the
University of St. Thomas Law Journal Symposium: Islamic Law and Constitutional Liberty (Apr.
12, 2010); Faisal Kutty, Joel Nichols & Asma Uddin, Panel Presentation at the University of St.
Thomas Law Journal Symposium: Islamic Law and Constitutional Liberty (Apr. 12, 2010); see
also John R. Bowen, How Could English Courts Recognize Shariah?, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 411
(2010); Faisal Kutty, The Myth and Reality of “Shari’a” Courts in Canada: A Delayed Opportu-
nity for the Indigenization of Islamic Legal Rulings, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 559 (2010); Asma T.
Uddin, Religious Freedom Implications of Sharia Implementation in Aceh, Indonesia, 7 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 603 (2010).
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This institutional-legal component is in some ways where the real
nitty-gritty action of constitutional affairs takes place among lawyers. One
of the things that a good law school education does is prepare the student to
be an active player in the institutional-legal side of constitutional affairs.
One could be a politician and never bother with how the legal institu-
tions actually operate, and instead limit oneself, for example, to filling insti-
tutions with people who you think share your views. One could be a
philosopher or an engaged public citizen, talking about the great questions
of the foundations of law and society in the country in which you live, and
really do very little and even know very little about how the actual practical
institutional-legal details of your society actually work. When you need the
practical details, you call a lawyer.
Lawyers, by contrast, have to be engaged in the day-to-day practical
institutional details in order to do their jobs. Learning how to navigate the
system means developing an expertise in these institutional-legal details. In
the countries that are majority-Muslim today, the institutional-legal side of
the question of what role Islam plays in the constitutional system is often
the least clear.
Certain parts of it are relatively clear. If you are a family law lawyer in
Egypt and someone comes to you with a dispute, you can, almost all of the
time, give them a pretty good account of which institutional arrangements
they will have to negotiate. Which court will hear this question? Which
court will hear that question? Where do you have to go, what do you have
to do? Lawyers in a country like Egypt will do the same thing for their
clients that lawyers will do in any system, namely, help them to figure out
what to do with a complicated issue of interpersonal dynamics, like a di-
vorce or a marriage. But with respect to the constitutional level of politics,
the question of whether, for example, a court will actually say that a given
law is unconstitutional because it falls afoul of the values of Islam, or with
respect to a question of whether a law truly captures, in some sense, the
spirit of Islamic law—those questions are in many cases deeply contested,
but also institutionally unresolved.
It is difficult to know today just how the institutional-legal side of the
relationship between Sharia and the constitutional liberty will play itself
out. Certainly, in Afghanistan, the legal system is itself still operating in a
very rudimentary way in most of the country. In Iraq, legal development is
far more advanced, but the institutional practices of courts are in the process
of transitioning from one legal system that was well understood by its prac-
titioners to a new legal system which is more complicated and in many
ways less clear. That is equally true in countries that have not undergone
upheavals like Afghanistan and Iraq, but where the political plane is con-
tested and debated in such a way as to call into question the results in prac-
tical, real-world cases.
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What is remarkable about constitutional law and what makes constitu-
tional law so hard, I think, is that in any real-world case that a client might
bring to you, all three of these planes might be in play. If the case becomes
well-known enough, it can engage politicians. If the case becomes popu-
larly debated, it can engage philosophy. And inevitably, it will engage the
question of practical institutional design and control and the problem of
law. Thus, when one wants to generalize about this third category, the insti-
tutional-legal category, the difficulty is much greater than it is in generaliz-
ing about the political forces or in generalizing about the philosophical
forces that are at work in the contemporary Muslim world.
What, then, can we say about these three levels by way of summing up
analysis of where we are now and where we are going? Let us go back to
our first category, the category of the political. In countries where autocratic
governments have continued to limit and constrain the capacity of Islamist
political movements to take action, Islamism is stronger, more vibrant, and
more powerful as a political force than it is in those countries where Islam-
ism has been allowed by state authorities to play a greater role in actual
practical governance. That might seem counterintuitive, because after all,
repressing a political movement is usually a bad thing for that political
movement. I am suggesting something to the contrary. In fact, one of the
key sources of growth and success for Islamism has been its repression by
governments that are not perceived by their citizens as legitimate. I think it
is possible to observe this trend line throughout the region.30
Where, by contrast, Islamists run for office, are elected to office, and
have the opportunity to try to govern, popular support for them tends to
decline. It tends to wane for the very simple reason that many of the people
who are voting for these parties are voting for them to express their frustra-
tion with what they see as corrupt or illegitimate governments. When Is-
lamist politicians are elected and turn out to be human, and therefore
susceptible to many of the same political pressures, fallibility, and even in
some cases the same corruption as autocratic governments, then public
opinion about those political parties begins to stabilize. This is a very com-
plicated question worthy of many symposia.
I have participated in a few of them so far without reaching any resolu-
tion. If one looks at the recent Iraqi elections, one can see that this is a very
complicated claim to make, but in at least some cases, several of the politi-
cal parties that self-consciously organized themselves around religion did
far worse in recent elections than they had done previously. That is an ex-
ample of how allowing politicians to be elected on Islamist platforms leads,
I think, to actual Islamist politicians proving that they are human and no
longer able definitively to offer a solution. By contrast, in countries where
30. See FELDMAN, supra note 20, at 43–45; see also id. at 162–68 (describing this phenome-
non in Egypt).
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autocracies still repress political Islam, popular support for those political
movements seems to be as strong as it ever was, and in some ways possibly
even growing. The reason is that political Islam, or Islamism, represents in
those countries an alternative to the system that exists—an alternative that
is centered and also philosophically appealing.
Turn now to the question of philosophy. The idea that one might con-
struct a just and legitimate state around the principles of Sharia, Islamic
law, and Islamic legal tradition, I think, has the capacity to continue to grow
in appeal as it has done for most of the last several decades. For that to
happen, those governments that get a chance to implement these values
must be able to do it in a way that communicates to ordinary citizens that
these governments actually are in some sense implementing these values.
Abstraction is well and good, but if you are elected to government on a
platform that includes a philosophical claim about the truly Islamic nature
of the state and then nothing changes, people may become disillusioned
with you as a politician. Then they also become disillusioned with your
ideas, because actual human beings always carry out philosophical ideas.
There is no such thing as a philosophical idea that exists in an utterly Pla-
tonic way in politics. Philosophical ideas are promoted by actual human
beings who are then connected to actual institutions. Those ideas have to be
implemented in a way that seems appealing to people for those ideas to
continue to grow in value. My conclusion with respect to the philosophical
plane is that it is growing, has actually become much more sophisticated
over the last twenty years, and shows every prospect of continuing in those
directions.
Much of the debate twenty years ago on the philosophical question of
whether the state should be Islamic or secular focused on the claim (made
mostly by secularists) that it was impossible to have a democratic state that
was grounded in Islamic values. That argument has faded almost to the
point of disappearing in the majority of Muslim countries. There is still a
very lively debate on the institutional question, which I will turn to in a
moment. But the theoretical claim that somehow democracy and Islam are
incompatible is now almost as obsolete as was its precursor, which was the
philosophical claim made in Western constitutional thought from the early
part of the nineteenth century until the middle of the twentieth century, that
Catholicism and democracy were incompatible.
Political science textbooks from roughly 1830 to roughly 1930 often
presented it as an inevitable fact of philosophy and institutional design that
only northwestern European, i.e., Protestant, countries could generate dem-
ocratic institutions, and that Catholic countries could not. That view, obvi-
ously, is anachronistic. Many people today have never even heard of it.
Certainly, at the University of St. Thomas School of Law, the natural reac-
tion to a claim like that should be that it is literally absurd. But it is an
important reminder to us that something can be deeply believed for centu-
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ries and then turn out to simply have been false. The claim of incompatibil-
ity of Islam and democracy, in my view, was of a comparable type to the
claim of incompatibility of Catholicism and democracy. It is just as false.
Turn then to the third plane, the institutional-legal plane. Here, the
prospects for what is going to happen in terms of constitutional governance
connected to Sharia are three-fold. One possibility is that there will be dy-
namic and innovative invention of new arrangements and new institutions
that somehow capture some of the values of an Islamic legal tradition, and
apply them in new ways to existing political legal arrangements. This is the
optimistic vision. It is just possible. A lot of very smart people think about
these questions in the Muslim world today and a lot of experimentation
goes on in many different places throughout the majority-Muslim world.
What is more, because of communication on the Internet, there is a great
deal of cross-pollination. If you have an idea and you use it effectively in
Malaysia, it is possible for people in Indonesia to know about it, but it is
also possible for people in Morocco to know about it. There is conversation,
discussion, and communication that may lead to some spread of semi-inno-
vative ideas.
The second possibility—a pessimistic possibility—is the possibility of
collapse. Islamists exercising constitutional authority will try to design in-
stitutions that may not work well. They will be subject to the same kinds of
problems and constraints as other governments that operate in relevant
countries, or that operate in the West for that matter. On this view, there
will be a kind of historical trend away from success, in which case the
political and philosophical trends will change, too. If over time, political
Islamists cannot deliver distinctive, effective institutions that actually im-
prove people’s lives, their ideas will seem less attractive and their political
movements will fail. The pessimistic possibility is a very real possibility as
well.
The third possibility lies somewhere in the middle: call it the mud-
dling-through option. In the muddling-through option, those components of
constitutional design that were intended originally to emphasize the Islamic
character of the state and to give a fundamentally Islamic grounding to the
state might simply exist on the periphery of the societies in which they
function. They might end up not mattering very much to ordinary people
most of the time. They might end up, therefore, not being especially appeal-
ing as a basis for political movements, but also not harming those political
movements. They might become the background noise of the constitutional
norms of a society. A consequence of the middle ground result is that the
rhetoric of constitutional discourse might change, while the realities in the
countries with these innovations might change very little.
Now, whether this is a good thing or a bad thing depends on how one
feels about muddling through. In the U.S. system, some people (I am one of
them) actually believe that muddling through in our deepest philosophical
2010] ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CONTEXT 451
debate has been a good thing. I do not think it would be good for the United
States if there were some way to resolve once and for all the question of
whether our values are derived from the Declaration of Independence or the
Constitution, or whether we are a state in some ultimate foundational way
based upon Christian values or whether we are a state in some ultimate way
based on secular values. We have tremendous diversity of opinion on these
questions in our country. Part of what a constitution does is to enable as
many citizens as possible to feel that it is their state, they belong to it, and it
belongs to them. When you begin to specify things in a more definitive way
it becomes harder for people who disagree with that view to feel loyalty and
citizenship and to play a participatory role. There are times when muddling
through is just fine.31 That may turn out to be the case for countries that are
presently involved in the kinds of debates that I describe in the Muslim
world.
Yet the thought that muddling through is just fine depends on believ-
ing that the institutional-legal realities work. If the institutional-legal reali-
ties do not work, and a substantial number of citizens feel that the state is
not fully their state and that it does not reflect their values in the way they
wish, then they will not feel allegiance to the state and society in which they
live. Then muddling through would be a tragic result.
I have given you three possible scenarios: an optimistic one, a pessi-
mistic one, and something in the middle. Though this analysis may not be
inspiring, it has the virtue of being honest. The best that I can do for you in
sketching these issues is to try to provide a framework for thinking about
them. That framework, as I have said, is political analysis, philosophical
analysis, and institutional-legal analysis. In each of those planes, there is
interaction between the ideas of constitutional democracy and Islamic law.
In each of those areas, there is contest, debate, and disagreement. Every
legal problem, from the smallest to the largest, will import to some extent
each of these three levels of analysis. If we look at things through these
three lenses, we have a better chance of understanding constitutional struc-
tures—and a better chance of gripping the question that we are struggling
with today.
31. See FELDMAN, supra note 23, at 220–49.
